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"BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO": SHOULD FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES BE DISMANTLED?
James A. Fanto*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the issues associated with the dismantling or
break-up of financial conglomerates. Financial conglomerate refers to a
holding company regulated as a financial holding company under
banking law, which owns subsidiaries involved in other financial
operations.' Many securities firms, which are regulated as broker-
dealers, operate within the conglomerate structure. Indeed, the financial
conglomerate typifies finance today because it offers a retail or
wholesale customer the complete range of financial services. The
subject of the break-up is timely because financial conglomerates were
at the center of the recent financial crisis, and in many cases, required
massive government aid to stay afloat.2 The conglomerates are the
subject of ongoing legislative and regulatory reforms, which include
proposals suggesting their partial break-up. 3 In addition, because the
financial crisis was worldwide and because the financial conglomerates
operate internationally, the issue of regulating them better, or breaking
them up, is a topic of international financial debate.
In the debate over financial conglomerates, it is useful to consider the
arguments for and against their break-up in order to appreciate the
difficulty of this topic and to help inform the related policy debates.
This Article argues that a break-up may make the most sense because of
the economic and political threats represented by the financial
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Barbara Black, Bill Bratton,
Frederick Tung, Hannah Buxbaum, Robert Ahdieh, Chris Brummer, Eric Chaffee and all the other
participants at the 2 3 d Annual Symposium of the Corporate Law Center of the University of Cincinnati
College of Law, where this Article was presented. The Article was written for this Symposium, which
was held on Mar. 5, 2010. As will be seen below, its subject is reform of financial institutions, and it
discusses legislative proposals made in the spring of 2010. Many of these proposals became law in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (July 21, 2010) (Dodd-Frank), which was passed after the Article entered the editing process. The
Article will make an occasional reference to Dodd-Frank, but does not otherwise examine that Act or
implementing regulation.
1. See infra subpart II.A.
2. See infra subpart II.B.
3. See infra subpart II.C.
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conglomerates. As will be explained,4 the conglomerates cannot be
managed successfully to prevent negative effects on the financial system
or the economy, and they represent a politically unhealthy dominance of
large finance and an associated "elite." The difficult question is how to
accomplish this break-up, given that the conglomerates have become
part of the financial status quo. This Article explores various break-up
options, including a spin-off of certain activities and the imposition of
size limitations, while recognizing that, given the domestic and
international preference for the status quo, the conglomerates will be
subject only to heightened regulation.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the financial conglomerate and
its origin as well as the impetus for the break-up discussions, which is
the failure or near failure of the conglomerates during the financial
crisis. This Part also discusses the evolving approach of the Obama
Administration to the problems in the financial conglomerate, which
included the concept of a partial break-up. Part III addresses several
salient problems arising in financial conglomerates: systemic risk; risk
management; commoditization and opaqueness of financial products and
services; compensation policies; conflicts of interest; and government
support and politics. Part IV analyzes whether these problems weigh in
favor of a break-up of the conglomerate, particularly in light of the
global operations of the conglomerates and international regulatory
efforts relating to them. Part V explores the ways in which a break-up
could be accomplished, again within the context and constraints of
global reform efforts. Part VI concludes with the observation that, while
the economic and political dangers posed by the conglomerates argue for
their break-up, the political reality is that they will continue in existence.
II. THE FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATE, THE CRISIS, AND THE BREAK-Up
PROPOSAL
A. The Financial Conglomerate
The financial conglomerate is generally a publicly traded holding
company with subsidiaries (and subsidiaries of these subsidiaries)
devoted to different financial activities, such as commercial banking,
securities brokerage and trading, investment advising, and insurance.
The largest financial institutions in the United States and in Europe are
financial conglomerates. 5 They may specialize in one group of financial
4. See infra Part IV.
5. For example, the top five existing U.S. banking groups, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America,
Citibank, Wells Fargo, and Wachovia (the latter two are now combined) have over one-half of the
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activities more than another, often reflecting the financial activity of
their origins. For example, although both firms engage in other financial
activities, Goldman Sachs is primarily a securities firm, while JP
Morgan Chase is primarily a banking firm. 6
The growth of the financial conglomerate in the United States over
the past thirty years has been told and retold.7 Conglomerates existed
before the Great Depression and the ensuing Glass-Steagall Act, which
led to their break-up,8 although U.S. finance was much simpler then.
The conglomerate resurfaced during the 1970s and the 1980s as the
three major financial sectors-commercial banking, investment banking,
and insurance-began to overlap, to compete with each other, and
eventually to consolidate.9 Conglomeration received its stamp of legal
approval in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Gramm-Leach-
Bliley),' 0 which produced the new legal structure of the financial
holding company whose subsidiaries could engage in diverse financial
activities.
Generally, the financial conglomerate is a reality in Europe, and to
some extent, Asia with the "universal bank," which engages in diverse
consolidated, as well as the domestic, assets of U.S. bank groups. See Release, Fed. Reserve, Insured
U.S.-Chartered Commercial Banks That Have Consolidated Assets of $300 Million or More, Ranked by
Consolidated Assets (Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/2009123l/
lrg bnkst.pdf. With respect to investment banking or securities activities, one sees similar names as
well as the firms historically specializing in them. See Investment Banking League Table, FT.COM, Dec.
20, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/ibleague (listing the top institutions as JP Morgan, Bank of
America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
UBS, Barclays Capital, and Royal Bank of Scotland). For considerable data on the growth and the size
of financial conglomerates, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963, 975-81 (2009).
It is true that, as economic production has shifted to countries like China, the largest world financial
institutions are no longer concentrated in Western countries. See Steven Bernard et al., The Decade for
Global Banks, FT.COM, Mar. 22, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea450788-1573-l Ide-
b9a9-0000779fd2ac.html.
6. Compare GOLDMAN SACHS, GOLDMAN SACHS 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2010), available at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investors/financials/current/annual-reports/2009-complete-
annual.pdf (pointing out that nearly all the revenue came from securities-related activities), with
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 2009 COMPLETE ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2010), available at
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchaselannual.cfm (showing diversity of its revenue stream,
with much concentration in commercial and consumer banking activities).
7. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 5; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation
of the US. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215.
8. For a brief, non-technical review of the Glass-Steagall Act provisions and their effect, see
LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 41-42 (3d ed. 2008).
9. See Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 222-23.
10. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 19
U.S.C.).
11. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (1) (2006).
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financial activities, not just commercial banking.12 However, non-U.S.
conglomerates traditionally emerged in countries with bank-centered
finance and were weighted more to banking and insurance. Thus, it is
accurate to say that the financial conglomerate as it exists today is really
something of a U.S. creation because it links together commercial
banking, retail banking, and to a lesser extent, insurance with the highly
developed securities activities of an investment bank. Indeed, European
conglomerates, like UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank, have over
time become more like U.S. financial conglomerates as they have
developed their securities activities.13  However, any reform of
conglomerates should be an international effort because they are a global
phenomenon.
The financial conglomerate could be viewed as the product of
financial or economic logic. Since financial activities all involve raising
funds for companies, helping people invest, and assessing risk in that
context (e.g., banks take deposits and make loans, investment banks
raise funds from investors for companies, insurance companies helps
companies and individuals pool funds to deal with risks), there is no
obvious reason why these related activities should be kept entirely
separate and not take advantage of natural synergies.14  Moreover, a
conglomerate can offer a retail customer or a sophisticated company, a
range of financial products on a national and international basis.' 5
These were the justifications leading to Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
Prior to the financial crisis, there was a diverse regulatory structure
for financial conglomerates. Conglomerates centered on commercial
banking, like JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup, were
regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
Federal Reserve) as financial holding companies. Investment banking
groups, like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers, and Bear Steams, were regulated as "consolidated supervised
entities" by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).16
12. See generally FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 3-49
(2000).
13. UBS is illustrative in this respect. It became more like a U.S. financial conglomerate by
acquiring a U.S. broker-dealer, Paine Webber. See UBS, ANNUAL REPORT 2009 22 (2010), available at
http://www.ubs.com/l/e/investors/annuatreporting/2009.html (section entitled "The making of UBS").
14. See generally FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY 4-9 (1996) (discussing some of these issues).
15. For this point, see Implications of the "Volcker Rules" for Financial Stability: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 11th Cong. (2010) (prepared written
statement of Hal S. Scott, Nomura Professor of Int'l Fin. Systems, Harvard Law Sch., & Dir., Comm. on
Capital Mkts. Regulation) [hereinafter Statement of Hal S. Scott], available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/201 0-Feb-4_Testimony.of_Hal S_Scott.pdf.
16. For a critical review of this program, see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
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Insurance groups, like the American International Group (AIG), were
regulated primarily by state insurance commissions and other financial
regulators, and it is unclear whether any regulator had a systematic view
of all of their activities and operations.17  Moreover, at the level of
subsidiaries engaged in specific financial activities, there is the system
of "functional regulation," meaning that each subsidiary is overseen by a
regulator whose traditional responsibilities include specific financial
activities (e.g., the SEC for broker-dealers).' 8  As a result of the
financial crisis, many investment banking groups failed or were
absorbed into other conglomerates; the remaining groups, including
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, elected to become bank, and then
financial, holding companies.19
B. The Financial Conglomerate in the Crisis
Financial conglomerates were at the center of the financial crisis.
There is no need to review this subject in any detail, for it has been
discussed in many articles, books, and conferences. 20  Nearly all
conglomerates were hurt by their sponsorship and holdings of mortgage-
backed securities, whose value declined precipitously as housing prices
stalled. The investment bank groups, which were highly leveraged and
reliant upon short-term funding, suffered first, with Bear Steams and
Lehman failing, Merrill Lynch rushing into the arms of Bank of
America, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley seeking the
protective umbrella of bank holding company status. 2 1 The federal
government had to provide extraordinary emergency assistance to the
COMM'N, REPORT No. 446-A, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITIES PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2008/446-a.pdf.
17. For the basics of insurance regulation, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 61-72 (2008).
18. Functional regulation was made official by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1844(c)(2)(B) (2006), but was the historical approach of U.S. financial regulation.
19. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm (announcing that Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley had been permitted to become bank holding companies on an emergency
basis).
20. Including other books and articles mentioned herein, there is an excellent collection of essays
in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson eds., 2009).
21. For one account (among many) of the collapse of the investment banks, see NORMAN S.
POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02[A] (4th ed. 2007 & Supp.
2010). For a journalistic account of the crisis, see ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, Too BIG To FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES (2009).
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commercial banking conglomerates, such as Citigroup and Bank of
America, as well as to the insurance conglomerate AIG due to its trading
activities in derivatives associated with mortgage-backed securities. No
financial conglomerate emerged unscathed during the crisis, although
some performed better than others. 22  But it should not be overlooked
that, in those extraordinary days during September and October 2008,
the federal government supported all the conglomerates in numerous
ways, and not simply through access to loans from the Federal Reserve's
discount window and the capital injections that the institutions received
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program.23
Following the Bush Administration's approach (and the approach of
concerned governments worldwide with respect to their own financial
conglomerates), the Obama Administration first sought to stabilize the
financial conglomerates (as opposed to other kinds of financial
institutions), which meant preventing further collapses.24 Thus, it
reworked the capital support for the conglomerates and other financial
institutions, re-designating such support as the Capital Purchase
Program, and naming the program the Financial Stability Plan; it
continued the extraordinary support to several particularly troubled
conglomerates, such as Citigroup and Bank of America.25 It then
oversaw the rehabilitation of the conglomerates through conducting
conglomerate-wide stress tests and trying to remove "legacy" assets
from their books. 26 These activities, again conducted on a global basis,
22. See, e.g., First Public Hearing of the FCIC: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2010) (statement of Brian T. Moynihan, Chief Executive Officer & President, Bank of
Am.) [hereinafter Statement of Brian T. Moynihan], available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/
2010-0113-Moynihan.pdf (asserting that bank groups were the strongest in the crisis, while the
overleveraged investment banks experienced the most problems).
23. Again, for a discussion of these actions, see POSER & FANTO, supra note 21, at 1-20 to 1-21.
For example, among other actions, the SEC restricted short-selling of the stock of major financial
institutions and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guaranteed newly-issued senior
unsecured debt of FDIC-insured institutions and of bank and financial holding companies.
24. For a good review of the U.S. and foreign programs to stabilize financial institutions, see
FABIO PANETTA ET AL., MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PAPER NO. 48, AN
ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL SECTOR RESCUE PROGRAMMES (2009). By contrast, U.S. bank failures
skyrocketed during this time. For example, 140 banks failed in 2009 and 127 have failed as of Sept. 29,
2010, whereas only 3 failed in 2007 and 25 failed in 2008. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Historical Statistics on Banking: Failures and Assistance Transactions, http://www2.fdic.govfhsob/
SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
25. For a summary of all the actions taken under this Plan, see U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
FinancialStability.gov, http://www.financialstability.gov (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
26. On the stress tests, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY
CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009) [hereinafter DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION] (discussing the method of the stress test); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg2009O5O7al.pdf (discussing results).
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proved successful insofar as the financial sector stabilized in mid-2009.
Indeed, many conglomerates returned to profitability, although primarily
as a result of activities that fell under the investment banking part of
their business, such as proprietary trading.2 7  And, as has been well
publicized, compensation in the conglomerates has returned to
extraordinary levels.28 The U.S. financial sector has also become even
29
more concentrated in the remaining financial conglomerates.
C. The Break-Up Proposal in the Context ofReforms
In its first year, the Obama Administration refrained from disturbing
the status quo of the financial sector, which meant maintaining the
dominance of the financial conglomerate. In particular, it proposed
reforms to the specific problems that emerged during the crisis.
Notably, this approach was generally in line with the international
responses to the crisis.30  For example, in a financial reform plan that
was the basis for its proposed legislation, the Obama Administration
suggested: (1) enhancing the risk management in financial firms; (2)
addressing risks that turned out to be more significant than previously
thought (e.g., liquidity risk); (3) increasing and modifying capital
requirements to address the problems (e.g., higher capital charge for
asset-backed securities); (4) aligning compensation in the financial
industry to correspond with the risks; (5) establishing a resolution
procedure for the conglomerates; (6) developing more transparency and
market structure for opaque securities and other financial products (i.e.,
the kind that are in the conglomerate); (7) bringing relatively
unregulated financial institutions (or "shadow banking") within the
regulatory system; and (8) reforming credit rating agencies on which
financial firms rely.31  The Obama Administration proposed several
Removing legacy or bad assets from conglomerate books involved a program called the Public-Private
Investment Program (PPIP) pursuant to which the federal government and private investors would set up
investment funds, also supported by government loans, to purchase these assets. For a description of
this program, see U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Road to Stability: Public-Private Investment Program,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/publicprivatefund.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
27. The remaining conglomerates had a source of cheap money from the Federal Reserve and
had fewer competitors. See, e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., supra note 6, at 53 (presenting break-down
in activities).
28. See, e.g., ANDREW M. CUOMO, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.Y., No RHYME
OR REASON: THE 'HEADS I WIN, TAILS You LOSE' BANK BONUS CULTURE (2009) (explaining how
compensation in financial services firms remains high despite their enormous losses in 2007 and 2008).
29. There are simply fewer conglomerates (e.g., JP Morgan acquired Bear Stearns, and Bank of
America combined with Merrill Lynch).
30. See PANETTA ET AL., supra note 24.
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
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innovative reforms, such as the creation of a systemic risk oversight
board, which would be on the lookout for risks that could upset the
financial system, and the creation of a consumer financial protection
agency, which would protect consumers from improper financial
products and terms. 32
The reform proposal included suggestions that a financial
conglomerate could be reduced in size or limited in its activities, if it
posed risks to the financial system.33 In a certain respect, this
suggestion was a standard bank regulatory approach where regulators
would take action only when some attribute of an institution threatened
to cause it to fail or otherwise adversely affect the financial system. 34
Initially, this is as far as the Obama Administration went with respect to
dismantling the financial conglomerate, apart from the proposal for a
new resolution process for conglomerates.
However, after a year in office, the Obama Administration began
making reform proposals that had the potential to result, indirectly or
directly, in a break-up, or at least a size reduction, of financial
conglomerates. It is not entirely clear what led to the Obama
Administration's change of heart, although the perception that the
financial conglomerates were resisting any reform and returning to their
free-spending ways with respect to compensation may have affected
policy-makers in the Executive Branch. First, it proposed a yearly tax or
fee on the largest financial institutions, specifically those with $50
billion in assets and those that own an insured financial institution or a
broker-dealer, as a way of funding the expenses of the financial system
rescue that would not otherwise be recouped from banks.35 The
proposed fee, .15%, would be assessed on conglomerates' total assets,
minus the strongest capital (known as Tier 1)36 and minus federally-
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 10-18 (2009) [hereinafter FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM].
32. See id. at 10, 14-15. This reform plan also had an international component, which
demonstrated the Obama Administration's recognition that, because conglomerates were international in
scope, reforms affecting them had to be accomplished through international efforts. See id at 16.
Certain aspects of the reform proposal are discussed in James A. Fanto, Financial Regulation Reform:
Maintaining the Status Quo, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 635 (2010).
33. See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 31, at 24-25.
34. Indeed, the reform plan references the prompt corrective action regime in place for federally-
insured banks. See id. at 24; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006).
35. See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Proposes Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee to Recoup Every Last Penny for American Taxpayers (Jan. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-proposes-financial-crisis-responsibility-
fee-recoup-every-last-penn (with hypertext link to Fact Sheet on the Financial Crisis Responsibility
Fee). The Obama Administration estimates that the fee would be in place for at least ten years.
36. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A, II.A.1 (2010).
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insured deposits or insurance reserves in the case of an insurance
conglomerate. The fee is thus an explicit tax on overall size and the
non-deposit leverage of conglomerates and arguably explicitly targets
those, like the investment banking-dominated conglomerates Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, where securities activities, rather than
commercial banking, are paramount.37
Second, the Obama Administration proposed the Volcker Rule,
named after Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve head and a
current economic advisor to President Obama.38 Under this rule, any
insured financial institution or financial conglomerate regulated as a
bank or financial holding company (i.e., since the market meltdown,
literally all the conglomerates) could not sponsor or invest in a hedge
fund or private equity fund or engage in proprietary trading.39 With
respect to the latter restriction, the proposal clarifies that neither an
insured bank nor a financial holding company can operate a trading desk
organized to speculate with the firm's own money on commodities,
securities, options, derivatives, or other financial instruments. 4 0  This
proprietary trading is distinguished from market-making and hedging
operations of the firm, which are principal activities, but are primarily
designed to serve customers of the conglomerate. The justification for
this restriction, which would clearly require legislative change because
these activities are allowed under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 41 is that it is
37. Indeed, the Obama Administration estimated that 60% of the fee would be paid by the ten
largest conglomerates. See The White House, Fact Sheet on the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/financial responsibility feefactsheet.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2010).
38. See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size
and Scope of Financial Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (Jan. 21, 2010), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-scope-
financial-institutions-rein-c.
39. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, "Volcker Rule" Proposed Language (2010) [hereinafter
Proposed Language], available at http://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20100304/
VoIckerRule.doc (proposing addition of new §§ 13 and 13a to the Bank Holding Company Act).
"Sponsoring" a fund is distinguished in the proposed rule from advising a fund and refers to directing
and controlling the fund (or sharing the same name for corporate and marketing purposes). See id
(proposed § 13(f)(3)). There are exceptions with respect to small business and other funds. The
proposed rule would also restrict certain relationships between the covered party and hedge or private
equity funds that the covered party is only advising, rather than sponsoring.
40. See id. (proposed § 13(a), (t)(1)); Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by
Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury)
[hereinafter Statement of Neal S. Wolin], available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfn?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_1D-54b42ccO-7ecd-4cOd-88cO-
65f7d2002061&WitnessID-a2a8O2ec-6db7-4748-a73f-902b35d0e51d (at 4). There are exceptions to
this ban on proprietary trading for trading in U.S. government and related obligations and for trading
conducted outside the U.S. by a foreign company not controlled by any U.S. company.
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2006).
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inappropriate, for issues of risk and equity, for the implied government
guarantee to a financial holding company to be used for proprietary
trading.42 The restriction on a firm's sponsoring and investing in hedge
funds and private equity funds is justified on the grounds that these
activities are often the functional equivalent of proprietary trading, that
they pose particular risks to the financial conglomerate,43 and that they
pose too many potential conflicts of interest." While the actual
language of the Volcker Rule appeared to apply the prohibitions only to
insured banks and bank or financial holding companies, which suggested
that a conglomerate could simply shift these activities to a subsidiary of
a holding company, legislation that was introduced in the Senate
required a spin-off from the conglomerate of proprietary trading and
hedge and private equity fund sponsorship and investing.45
While proposing the Volcker Rule, the Obama Administration also
put forward a size limit on regulated financial conglomerates (i.e., bank
or financial holding companies). Under current law, there is a limit on
the amount of national deposits that a bank group may have (10%), but it
only prohibits an acquisition that would take the group over the limit,
not to internal growth.46 The Obama Administration suggested that
another size limitation should be imposed on all financial institutions,
not just commercial banks and bank or financial holding companies, but
keyed it to "total consolidated liabilities."4 7 This restriction would again
42. See Statement of Neal S. Wolin, supra note 40, at 3; Prohibiting Certain High-Risk
Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Illth Cong. (2010) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
President's Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd.) [hereinafter Statement of Paul A. Volcker], available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/ index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_1D=54b42ccO-
7ecd-4cOd-88c0-65f7d2002061 &WitnessID=091 f5a89-dec4-4905-9fal -678bfbec823a (at 1-2).
43. See Statement of Neal S. Wolin, supra note 40, at 3; Statement of Paul A. Volcker, supra
note 42, at 1-2.
44. See Statement of Neal S. Wolin, supra note 40, at 4; Statement of Paul A. Volcker, supra
note 42, at 4. This criticism applies as well to proprietary trading. The Volcker Rule would also require
the application of capital and other requirements to nonbank financial companies that are engaged in
proprietary trading and sponsoring or investing in hedge or private equity funds. See Proposed
Language, supra note 39 (proposed § 13(e)(1)).
45. See PROP Trading Act, S. 3098, 11Ith Cong. (2010), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=11 1congbills&docid=f:s3098is.txt.pdf
(see proposed § 6(h)(2) of the Bank Holding Company Act). It does this essentially by having the
prohibition reach the banking institution, the holding company, and any affiliates or subsidiaries of
them. Among other differences, this proposed Act would be self-executing (i.e., it would go into effect
no later than two years after enactment), whereas the Volcker Rule would require implementation by
federal banking regulators to take effect. The Volcker Rule was enacted as Title VI of Dodd-Frank.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 601-28, 124 Stat. 1376, 1596-1641 (July 21, 2010).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A) (2006).
47. See Proposed Language, supra note 39 (proposed § 13a(a)).
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be triggered by an acquisition, not internal growth, and would ban any
acquisition where the resulting group's total consolidated liabilities
exceeded 10% of aggregate consolidated liabilities of all U.S. financial
institutions.48 The additional size limitation was justified on the grounds
that financial conglomerates were funding themselves more through
non-deposit liabilities than deposits, and so a size limitation had to focus
on this kind of funding, and that the failure of large financial companies
caused considerable externalities.49 The Obama Administration
recognized that, in this proposal as well as in the break-up suggestion, it
was running against the historical trend in other countries that have large
financial conglomerates engaged in all kinds of activities. However, it
appeared to believe that other countries would be receptive to these
activities and size limitations.
Thus, the Obama Administration introduced the ideas of a break-up
and size limitation on financial conglomerates as debates over financial
reform legislation began in earnest, and as this legislation began to make
its way through Congress in the first half of the 2010.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATE
This Part identifies and briefly discusses the problems that have been
associated with financial conglomerates, particularly in the crisis of
2008-2009. As will be clear, the problems often (although not
exclusively) arise from securities activities undertaken within a
conglomerate, including: (1) systemic risk; (2) risk management; (3)
commoditization vs. opaqueness of financial products; (4) compensation
policies; (5) conflicts of interest; and (6) government support and
politics. The goal here is not to examine them exhaustively, but to
highlight them in order to set the stage for an analysis about the need to
break-up the conglomerates.
A. Systemic Risk
This problem refers to the fact that the financial system is threatened
with collapse because of the failure of a financial institution, which will
start a chain of failures of other institutions and a paralysis of financial
48. Id (proposed § 13a(a)). Liabilities would be essentially defined as total risk-weighted assets
minus regulatory capital. Id. (proposed § 13a(c)). The size limitation would reach any nonbank
financial company that might fall under Federal Reserve regulation through current reforms. Absolute
size limitations on financial conglomerates did not survive in Dodd-Frank, which simply ordered a
study of the need for them. See § 123, 124 Stat. at 1412.
49. See Statement of Neal S. Wolin, supra note 40, at 4-5.
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activity leading to the collapse of the system.5 0  As seen during the
crisis, the realization of this risk can have a devastating effect upon the
larger economy when it brings all financial transactions to a halt:
financial participants worry about their own and their counterparties'
exposures to the troubled firm and to potential other problem firms.
Systemic risk is particularly associated with financial conglomerates
because given their size and diversity of activities, they are engaged in
so many financial activities and are so interconnected in the financial
system with many counterparties that their failure is presumed to have a
systemic effect.5 ' Systemic risk is no longer an academic issue because
it appeared in the crisis with the collapse of Bear Steams, the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers, and a subsequent run on other major conglomerates
(e.g., AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch), which in turn
led to extraordinary government efforts to sustain other conglomerates
in danger of collapse and to stand behind any other whose collapse could
have a systemic effect. 52  Indeed, the government's stress testing of
them in the spring of 2009 was to assure other financial participants that
they were safe to deal with.53
B. Risk Management
Risk management encompasses the assessment of risks in a financial
institution and the management of them so as to prevent their realization
and to be prepared for their impact.54 The problem of risk management
in financial conglomerates is related to that of systemic risk. Since a
financial conglomerate's activities and investments are numerous,
diverse, and complex, the risks associated with them are difficult, if not
impossible, properly to assess and control. If the risks cannot be
adequately identified and prepared for, the conglomerate will not be
50. See PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C. HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT & FINANCIAL SERVICES
492 (7th ed. 2008).
51. See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN,.TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 60-79 (2004) (discussing how characteristics of large banks, particularly their dealings only
with other large financial institutions, have increased the systemic risk and thus the probability of a
government bailout to prevent its realization).
52. See Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird's-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes
and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1, 2-7 (Viral
V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (arguing that the systemic crisis actually began in the
summer of 2007 with the collapse of the subprime market).
53. See DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 26, at 3-4.
54. The discussion in this subpart draws on two of my articles: Anticipating the Unthinkable: The
Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731
(2009); Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis in Risk Management: Preparing for the Worst, in THE
PANIC OF 2008, at 77-93 (Lawrence Mitchell & Arthur Wilmarth eds. 2010).
564
2010] DISMANTLING FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
ready for their realization, which could lead to the institution's failure
and, in turn, to systemic risk.s5
The financial crisis exposed serious problems with risk management
and its supervision in financial conglomerates and raised the important
question whether the conglomerates have become so big and complex
that their risks cannot be managed. Modeling techniques for measuring
risk proved to be inadequate in predicting losses from activities and
investments, especially in asset-backed securities and related financial
instruments. However, this turned out to be fatal because the financial
position of a financial conglomerate depends upon the models that help
establish the amount of capital that an institution needs as a protection
against its risks (i.e., capital is risk-based). Risk modeling is
supplemented by judgmental exercises, such as stress testing and
scenario analysis, which anticipate the effects on an institution from an
extremely bad event. But these exercises were often neglected and, in
any event, they raise epistemological and behavioral issues with respect
to the conglomerate: does the complexity of these institutions make
adequate stress testing or scenario analysis impossible? 56  Will risk
managers, executives, and regulators ever adequately play out the
necessary scenarios and then respond to adverse results in good times?
The evidence from conduct in the conglomerates before the financial
collapse suggests otherwise.
C. Commoditization and Opaqueness
Financial services are under constant price pressure because many
financial products become standardized and thus commodities, which
55. See also First Public Hearing of the FCIC: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) [hereinafter
Statement of Mary L. Schapiro], available at http://www.feic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114-
Schapiro.pdf (at 10-11); First Public Hearing of the FCIC: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.) [hereinafter
Statement of Sheila C. Blair], available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114-Bair.pdf (at
26-27).
56. See Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable, supra note 54, at 739-45.
57. But see First Public Hearing of the FCIC: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2010) (statement of Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO, The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.) [hereinafter Statement of Lloyd C. Blankfein], available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/
pdfs/2010-0113-Blankfein.pdf (at 12) (explaining the strengths of Goldman Sachs's risk management
and the problems of risk management in the industry, but cautioning that in reforms, "[wie should resist
a response .. . that is solely designed around protecting us from the 100-year storm"). On the other
hand, others would advocate that preparation for the unlikely event is the goal of risk management. See,
e.g., International Insurance Society Roundtable on Risk Management After the Crisis, 21 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Sept. 2009, at 28, 37-38 (remarks of Prem Watsa, chairman and CEO of Fairfax Financial
Holdings in Canada).
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reduces their profit margin. Therefore, there is constant pressure on
financial firms, including conglomerates, to respond to the
commoditization by extending products to new customers and by
inventing and capitalizing on new products and services.s A related
development is for financial firms to offer products and services to
institutional investors in non-standardized areas in opaque trading
venues. However, this movement of commoditization and opaqueness
can pose a danger to a financial firm if it extends products beyond an
appropriate customer base or if it engages in opaque products that are
not easily regulated, either by the firm itself or by regulators.59
Certainly, the tremendous growth of asset-backed securities and related
financial instruments can be explained by both commoditization and
opaqueness. Financial conglomerates engaged in making home loans to
lower-quality borrowers and then produced asset-backed securities
based on these loans, with all of their permutations (CDOs, CDOs 2),
complicated tranche structures and offering vehicles (SIVs), which were
offered privately and traded off exchanges in dealer markets.o When
housing prices stalled, these activities created enormous losses for the
conglomerates. The losses were exacerbated by the opaque nature of
many of the products leading to the inability of conglomerates, their
counterparties, and regulators to value them.6 1
D. Compensation Policies
It is undisputed that compensation policies in financial services and in
financial conglomerates have been short term in nature and rewarded
short-term performance. How this situation came about is a complicated
story covered by other contributions to this symposium. 62  Certainly,
58. See generally ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 52-62 (1998).
59. See generally Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Finance: Before the Next Meltdown,
DEMOCRACYJOURNAL.ORG, Summer 2009, at 19, available at http://www.democracyjoumal.org/pdf/l3/
JohnsonKwak.pdf.
60. See Anthony Saunders et al., Enhanced Regulation ofLarge, Complex Financial Institutions,
in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 139-48 (Viral V. Acharya &
Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
61. See also Statement of Sheila C. Bair, supra note 55, at 4-5 (observing that only financial
conglomerates could participate in the securitization process that was at the heart of the crisis and that
fell between traditional banking and investment banking and that they are also the kinds of institutions
involved in innovation (which does not always make financial sense) and with the capital to act as
dealers in non standardized financial products).
62. See Frederick Tung, Professor, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Compensation, Cartels, and
Competition: A Political Economy of the Financial Stability Board and its Principles for Sound
Compensation Practices, Remarks at the 23" Annual Symposium of the Corporate Law Center of the
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Mar. 5, 2010).
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there are many causes to these compensation policies, such as the
increasing fee nature of financial services 63 and the transformation of
financial firms from partnerships to publicly traded corporations, with
the latter business form allowing firm employees to move easily from
firm to firm." Yet this short-term nature of compensation creates
significant risks in financial firms because it encourages employees to
pursue high risk activities that will lead to short-term results regardless
of their long-term effects. This problem is magnified in a financial
conglomerate, as the financial crisis demonstrated, for the risks of
compensation policies explode when all employees are pursuing short-
term gains. Again, the example of the asset-backed securities comes to
mind: loan officers had an incentive to make loans quickly and without
regard for the quality of borrowers; bank officers wanted to move the
loans off their books; the employees of securities firms packaged them
into pools and sold off pool-based securities in diverse instruments,
tranches and derivatives; and brokers and investment advisers were paid
for moving the securities and financial instruments into portfolios. 65
The list could go on and on.
E. Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest have long been a problem in financial services.
Traditionally, the conflict question concerned a financial firm
benefitting one client at the expense of another. 66 That concern remains
strong, as seen in the news concerning Goldman Sachs's favoring
certain clients over others with respect to its market analysis.67 Yet the
conflict issue is again magnified in the financial conglomerate first
because firms are involved in so many financial activities with so many
different clients. Second, the conflicts issue has grown in importance on
account of the enormous expansion of the principal activities of a
63. See INST. OF INT'L. FIN., FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF COMMITTEE ON MARKET BEST
PRACTICES: PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS 58-62 (2008).
64. See Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., The Demise of Investment Banking
Partnerships, 63 J. FINANCE 311 (2008). And firms like this "free agent" structure, which allows them
considerable flexibility with respect to retaining, or getting rid of, employees. See Statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, supra note 55, at 18.
65. See Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking Compensation in Financial Firms, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 197, 20346 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson eds., 2009).
66. See, e.g., Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979), abrogated by
Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1992) (case involving a bank funding a takeover of a
longstanding client).
67. See Susanne Craig, Goldman's Trading Tips Reward its Biggest Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug.
24, 2009, at Al.
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conglomerate, which is no longer just a market maker in exchange-
traded securities, over-the-counter (OTC) securities, derivatives, and
commodities, but is an active investor side-by-side with its clients.68
Given that proprietary trading and investing activities demand
significant capital, it is no surprise that they occur primarily in financial
conglomerates. Therefore, in many ways, financial conglomerates have
evolved from being client-centered firms to employee-centered firms
and to a lesser extent shareholder-centered firms. When coupled with
such factors as the short-term nature of compensation and the diversity
of activities in firms, this development produces too great an incentive
for information to drift over the compliance and other control systems
that firms have put in place to protect clients. Again, the best example
of this is the recent SEC lawsuit brought against Goldman Sachs for
favoring itself and one investor in the structuring and sale of synthetic
collateralized debt securities.69
F. Government Support and Politics
As was clear after the Lehman Brothers collapse, the federal
government did not allow any other financial conglomerate to fail and
provided them with numerous federal subsidies and an implicit federal
guarantee.70 Thus, counterparties and creditors of the conglomerates are
no longer concerned about default risk in them for the conglomerates
have become "too big to fail."7  This means that conglomerates receive
a subsidy from the federal government, in the form of lower cost of
capital, and are not subject to an important level of creditor or
counterparty discipline, which makes a firm pay for its default risk (i.e.,
creditors believe that they will always be paid off by the government).
This subsidy also distorts the market for financial services because
financial firms that are not conglomerates do not benefit from it, putting
72them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to the conglomerates.
68. See Statement of Paul A. Volcker, supra note 42, at 4.
69. See Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-03229-BSJ-MHD (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 16, 2010). Goldman eventually settled the lawsuit for $550 million. See SEC v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., Litig. Release No. 21,592 (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010Ir2l592.htm.
70. See Acharya et al., supra note 52, at 43-45.
71. See David A. Moss, An Ounce of Prevention: Financial Regulation, Moral Hazard, and the
End of "Too Big to Fail, " HARV. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 25, 27. Of course, there is the risk that the
government supporting the conglomerates can fail, which is the ultimate default risk. Perhaps in light of
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and in Europe, it is not entirely far-fetched to say that the guarantee
of the U.S. government behind U.S. conglomerates is not failsafe, for a default by the U.S. is not outside
the realm of possibility.
72. See Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the Independent
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This government support also makes the financial conglomerate a
political issue, for it has become clear that the government favors certain
firms in the financial industry and those associated with these firms.
Employees in financial conglomerates, who already benefit from high
compensation, receive a direct wealth transfer from the federal
government, and thus from U.S. citizens outside the conglomerates,
when their firms are propped up. Those citizens, many of whom are
suffering the effects of the economic downturn, are asked to fund this
transfer not as a result of any positive benefit to themselves, but the
justification is to prevent the loss of the status quo-the subsidy
prevents the financial system from collapsing.7 3  This justification has
not been politically convincing during a time of economic hardship
because it is not psychologically convincing (i.e., it tells people to
suffer, while employees in conglomerates, who contributed to the
financial collapse, continue to receive extraordinary compensation).74
Indeed, as Simon Johnson has argued, the financial crisis revealed
that those associated with and supportive of financial conglomerates
constitute an oligarchy that has captured the federal government,
specifically Congress and the Executive Branch, in general and financial
regulators in particular. As is customary for elites, the power of the
financial elite is partly based upon an ideology that justifies its
privileged position in terms of the public benefits it confers.76 In this
case, the ideology is that as a natural development of financial services,
Community Bankers of America 2010 National Convention and Techworld (Mar. 19, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/chairman/spmarl910.html) (explaining that financial
conglomerates have a lower cost of funds because of the "too big to fail" implicit government
guarantee).
73. For a typical justification from this perspective, see Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Preserving a Central Role for Community Banking, Address at the
Independent Community Bankers of America 2010 National Convention and Techworld 3 (Mar. 20,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.federaireserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20100320a.pdf).
74. It could be argued that this justification violates individuals' basic notions of fairness. See
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 412-13 (2000).
75. Johnson, a professor of economics at MIT and former chief economist of the International
Monetary Fund, and James Kwak, a law student at Yale, operate a well-known blog, the Baseline
Scenario, where they regularly advocate this position in light of the financial crisis and financial reform.
Simon Johnson & James Kwak, The Baseline Scenario, http://baselinescenario.com (last visited Sept.
30, 2010). See also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANcIAL MELTDOWN (2010).
76. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, RAISONS PRATIQUES: SUR LA THEORIE DE L'ACTION 229-33 (1994);
see also Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Authority, After the Crises: Assessing the Costs and
Benefits of Financial Liberalisation: 14th Chintaman Deshmukh Memorial Lecture, Reserve Bank of
India, Mumbai 9 (Feb. 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Speeches/
PDFs/ISRTI202201O.pdf) (discussing ideology of financial innovation and expansion, which benefitted
certain firms and their employees).
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financial conglomerates are raising everyone's wealth through their
products and contribution to economic growth and stability, which then
explains the elite's deserved, albeit outsized, status and compensation. 7
However, the financial crisis discredited this ideology and revealed it for
what it is-a self-interested justification for the elite's wealth extraction.
This revelation of the financial elite's political power and the emptiness
of its ideology has produced a politically explosive situation, as
exemplified by the populist hostility to the financial bailout, the Federal
Reserve and other financial regulators, the Obama Administration, and
the established members of Congress from both political parties.79
IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A BREAK-Up OF THE FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES
This Part considers arguments for and against a break-up of the
financial conglomerates. It focuses on whether a break-up is the best
way to deal with the problems identified in the preceding Part or
whether a less extreme solution can resolve them. Given the complexity
of the issue, the following discussion is intended to explore whether the
overall analysis points in a particular direction. Moreover, the analysis
will also take into consideration international constraints or preferences
that argue in favor of or against a break-up.
A. Systemic Risk
An argument for a break-up is that the systemic risk from the "too
big" and "too interconnected" conglomerates is simply too great and will
get worse as their size grows, which occurs with each financial crisis
when they combine into even larger conglomerates. The government is
forced into a cycle, in which it must periodically bail out financial
conglomerates to prevent a systemic collapse, but, by preserving the
conglomerates, this bailout makes future bailouts almost certain when a
new product or activity leads to the next collapse of the conglomerates.
Thus, rather than being a source of strength through its diversified
structure, a financial conglomerate is prone to instability from even
77. For a typical statement in this regards, see First Public Hearing of the FCIC: Hearing Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) (statement of Jamie Dimon, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer, JP Morgan Chase & Co.), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/
2010-0113-Dimon.pdf (at 6).
78. See, e.g., Brody Mullins & Jean Spencer, Obama To Keep Goldman Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 2010, at A5.
79. See Dylan Ratigan, Is Your Senator a Bankster?, TIH HUFFINGTON POST, May 7, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dylan-ratigan/is-your-senator-a-bankste_b_567907.html.
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small problems in financial products and activities, and this instability
has dire consequences for the financial system as a result of its size and
interconnectednes s.80 The only reasonable policy choice is to reduce the
size and the number of activities of conglomerates.8 1
The powerful counterargument would be that enhanced regulation, in
particular the reforms in current proposed legislation, will adequately
take care of the systemic risk posed by the conglomerates without losing
the benefits from these institutions. These reforms include establishing
a Financial Stability Oversight Council, enhancing the Federal Reserve's
oversight of a new category of "Tier 1" institutions that includes
conglomerates, and creating a special resolution regime for these
institutions. The Oversight Council would be an early warning system
for risks that could destabilize financial institutions and result in
systemic risk.82 With the help of this Oversight Council, the Federal
Reserve would have the power to monitor closely financial
conglomerates for the impact of developing risks, much as it did during
the stress tests, and to take preventive action. Moreover, if a
conglomerate is irretrievably damaged, a new resolution process,
modeled on the current resolution procedure for banks, will allow the
Treasury to orchestrate a takeover of a conglomerate with alternatives
for its sale or orderly wind-up, rather than having the government faced
with the alternatives of bailout or bankruptcy.84 The wind down can be
aided by a plan, established by the conglomerate beforehand with the
80. This is related to the argument, associated with the work of Hyman P. Minsky, that
contemporary finance and financial institutions are unstable and prone to excesses in times of economic
expansion, which lead to government bailouts. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE
ECONOMY 77-106 (2008); Jan Kregel, Is This the Minsky Moment for Reform of Financial Regulation?,
2-3 (Levy Inst. of Econ. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 586, 2010). Of course, smaller financial
institutions can pose a systemic threat as well if they are also interconnected, although their failure is
easier to deal with. See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
81. This would also mean doing the same for any unregulated financial institutions whose size
and diversity of activities similarly threaten financial stability.
82. The problem with writing about financial reform when this Article was originally composed
(spring of 2010) is that the legislation was being discussed and changed at that time. Accordingly, the
Article generally refers only to the Senate reform legislation that eventually resulted in the passage of
Dodd-Frank, not to other legislative proposals or to Dodd-Frank itself. On the Council, see Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, Amendment No. 3739, 11Ith Cong. §§ 111-21 (Apr.
29, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-1 I s3217AS/pdflBILLS-1 ls3217AS.pdf
[hereinafter, "S. 3217"]. The Oversight Council was implemented in Title I of Dodd-Frank. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111-23, 124
Stat. 1376, 1392-1412 (July 21, 2010).
83. See S. 3217, supra note 82, §§ 115, 165. Title I of Dodd-Frank adopted this enhanced
regulatory role of the Federal Reserve for systemically important firms. See Dodd-Frank §§ 111-23.
84. See S. 3217, supra note 82, §§ 201-211. The new resolution authority appears in Title II of
Dodd-Frank. See Dodd-Frank §§ 201-17.
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consultation of regulators, for its liquidation.s This approach of an
oversight board for systemic risk, with a resolution authority for
conglomerates, is the favored one in the global financial community and
among non-U.S. financial regulators. 86
Questions remain as to whether the Oversight Council will, in good
times, have the foresight to detect the risks that matter and possess the
will to direct the Federal Reserve to rein in the conglomerates, who will
argue that restrictions on their activities do not make sense. The new
resolution regime provides a final barrier to systemic risk if a
conglomerate fails, but one cannot help but wonder how it will work in
practice if, as the recent crisis has demonstrated, numerous financial
conglomerates will likely be failing at the same time because of their
collective involvement in certain activities and they will have operations
in numerous jurisdictions. Then, in a situation of international systemic
risk, the federal government will have the choice again between a
nationalization of numerous financial conglomerates and a bailout of
them-a choice that the financial reform is intended to remove. By
contrast, a break-up of the conglomerates prevents them from having
this systemic effect.
B. Risk Management
With regard to risk management, the argument for the break-up is that
85. See id. § 1l5(d). This is known as a "living will" for a conglomerate. See generally Robert
E. Litan, Whither Financial Reform?, ECONOMIST'S VOICE, Oct. 2009, at 1, 4; Emilio Avgouleas et al.,
Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action (Duisenberg Sch. of Fin., Policy Paper No. 4, 2010).
86. See, e.g., European Parliament, Comm. on Econ. & Monetary Affairs, Draft Report on the
Proposal for a Council Regulation Entrusting the European Central Bank with Specific Tasks
Concerning the Functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (Feb. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&refere
nce=PE438.515; Commission Communication: European Financial Supervision, COM (2009) 252 final
(May 27, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/
communicationmay2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK
RESOLUTION GROUP (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl62.pdf.
87. See, e.g., Statement of Mary L. Schapiro, supra note 55, at II (warning against being too
confident in consolidated supervision with respect to these complex firms).
88. The legislative package in fact provides for emergency guarantees to, among other
institutions, financial conglomerates to be provided by the FDIC during times of "severe economic
distress." See S. 3217, supra note 82, § 1155 (entitled "Emergency Financial Stabilization"). On the
other hand, the costs of systemic risk can be assessed ex ante and thus imposed upon financial
conglomerates. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/
workpaper/2010/wpl002.pdf (coming up with a measure of a conglomerate's contribution to this risk,
which can be used for assessing costs ex ante and which is different from the costs of a bank's failure
(i.e., to its liabilities)).
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the complexity and interconnections of the conglomerates, particularly
in light of the pressures for financial innovation and the skewed
incentives of compensation, make risk management in them a Herculean
and ultimately an impossible task. Moreover, given all the problems
with risk management relating to the limitations of risk models, failure
to engage in stress testing and scenario analysis, governance failures,
and limitations on regulatory oversight, 89  risk management will
inevitably break down, causing a systemic problem.90 One could
rationally try to deal with risk management problems by being very
conservative with respect to the regulation of conglomerates, which
would mean imposing capital requirements far beyond what risk models
require.91 But this would generate opposition from the financial
industry and would be difficult to defend when times are good. From a
pragmatic perspective, it makes sense just to break-up the conglomerates
into smaller parts that risk management can effectively manage.
But the break-up of conglomerates could be seen as a gross
overreaction to the recent failings of risk management. Proponents of
this activity could argue that risk management, as every human
endeavor, is improved through the useful experience of failure. Risk
models have been ameliorated (e.g., by using better data, inputting more
factors); stress testing and scenario analysis are now seriously being
used; and regulators are insisting that directors and high-level executives
pay attention to risk management. 92  Moreover, as one would expect,
risk management specialists have responded to the crisis by correcting
risk management failures or lacunae that were exposed. For example,
attention is now being given to liquidity risk, and the methods to address
it, such as having longer-term funding and contingent capital, 93 are
being implemented by conglomerates.94 As a result of risk management
89. See supra subpart IlI.B.
90. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis
of 2007-2009, in 4 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN FINANCE (forthcoming 2010) (contending that the
crisis arose because financial conglomerates "gamed" the risk capital system by holding asset-backed
securities that required little capital because their risk was not recognized, or by providing guarantees to
special investment vehicles holding such securities, pushed on by employees who were paid for these
investment that were high performing, since their risk was hidden).
91. See, e.g., Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, The Doomsday Cycle, CENTREPIECE, Winter
2009/2010, at 10 (arguing for tripling capital requirements of large firms).
92. For a general discussion of the need for improvements to risk management, see GROUP OF
THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 41 (2009). See also BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl68.pdf (discussing ways
to enhance oversight of risk management).
93. Contingent capital means debt financing that, in certain circumstances (e.g., near insolvency
by a conglomerate), converts automatically to equity.
94. See, e.g., BASEL CoMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS,
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improvements, overall capital requirements for conglomerates are being
raised to ensure that there is no repeat of the financial crisis.95
Furthermore, this focus on improving risk management in
conglomerates is being done in a way coordinated with international
financial regulators, in particular through the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements. In sum,
because reasonable, global steps to improve risk management problems
in conglomerates are being taken, a break-up of the conglomerate on risk
management grounds is not justified and flies in the face of international
financial regulation.
C. Commoditization and Opaqueness
The argument for a break-up with respect to commoditization and
financial innovation is that financial conglomerates, in good times, will
invariably extend too far into commoditized products and develop risky
innovative products. Once again, risk management will be unable to
deal with the risks arising from these activities, particularly with respect
to the new products that have not been adequately tested, and financial
conglomerates will suffer as a result because of their size and
interconnection. 96  Accordingly, at the very least, the parts of the
conglomerate most involved in financial innovation and opaque
markets-generally, although not exclusively, the securities
subsidiaries-should be spun off from the conglomerates so that the
damaging effects from the innovations do not affect the rest of the firm.
As for the risks involved in the inappropriate spread of "commoditized"
products like high risk mortgages, shrinking the firm's size could
address the fallout from these practices, which of course should also be
regulated.
The major counterargument against a break-up would be that it
needlessly sacrifices the economies of scale and scope that come from
commoditization and financial innovations in financial conglomerates.
PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION (2008), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl38.pdfnoframes=1; Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and
Liquidity Risk Management, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,656 (Mar. 22, 2010).
95. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR (2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl64.pdfnoframes=l (discussing ways to enhance capital requirements).
Title I of Dodd-Frank both enhanced the capital requirements for financial conglomerates and the
Federal Reserve's prudential regulation of them, particularly with respect to matters such as risk
management. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 111-76, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-1442 (July 21, 2010).
96. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability ofa Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1989).
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For example, financial innovations, like securitization or securities
trading technology, may at first be restricted, but eventually are
distributed widely and adapted to broader contexts and more customers
through the conglomerate. Moreover, a break-up would undermine the
financial conglomerates' potential to develop products dealing with risks
that could be important for ordinary individuals. 97  An improved risk
management should be able deal with the risks posed by new products
(so long as there is adequate testing of them) and with those arising from
a widespread extension of existing products. It might be more sensible,
then, to support a proposal such as that for a publicly funded "National
Institute of Finance," which would study the effects and risks of
innovative financial products. 98  It is likely that one's views on
improvements to risk management in the financial conglomerate will
mirror one's outlook on how to deal with the risks posed by
commoditization and opaqueness, and the global approach is in favor of
a risk management solution.
D. Compensation Policies
The short-term nature of compensation in financial services, when
combined with the size, interconnectedness, complexity, innovations,
and risk management failures of financial conglomerates, is a recipe for
disaster that ensures they will periodically collapse. Compensation
reforms cannot correct the problem because compensation will be tied to
risk models, which imperfectly capture risk and which in any event can
be gamed by employees. Moreover, the corporate form of the financial
conglomerate, as opposed to the former partnership form, makes a long-
term model of compensation for employees difficult to formulate.
In addition, compensation policies in financial conglomerates are
based on a finance model of human nature, the self-interested, profit-
maximizing individual. This model reinforces the short-term
perspective because it instructs individuals to focus on the self, as
97. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 107-85
(2003) (discussing potential new financial products).
98. See, e.g., Hedge Funds and the Financial Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, I10th Cong. (2008) (prepared written statement of Andrew W. Lo,
Professor, Mass. Inst. of Tech. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
images/stories/documents/20081113101922.pdf (recommending the creation of a Capital Markets Safety
Board). The proposed Financial Stability Oversight Council discussed above would also have this
purpose. For a bill to create a National Institute of Finance, see National Institute of Finance Act of
2010, S. 3005, 11llth Cong. (2010). Title I of Dodd-Frank did create an Office of Financial Research
within the U.S. Treasury Department, which would gather information on financial institutions and
financial trends. See §§ 151-56, 124 Stat. at 1412-20.
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opposed to institutions or organizations. 99 This approach is now over-
determined because it is the result of many causes, including teaching in
business schools and the primacy of the economic approach in policy-
making, and it will not change easily. 00  In other words, any
compensation reforms in the conglomerate will likely be undermined by
the tenacity of this model. This can be seen in the case of compensation
policies in the conglomerates following the financial crisis, which have
generally returned to prior practices, and with those in conglomerates
being unable to understand why there is any objection to their
compensation practices.o'0 Given the intractability of the compensation
problem, the only sensible way to address the dangers from
compensation practices in financial conglomerates is to keep the
institutions small.
Once again, one could argue that a break-up is unnecessary to deal
with the problem in compensation policies, because financial firms,
trade organizations, and regulators are revising them to address their
short-term nature. For example, compensation reforms propose longer
vesting and holding periods for equity compensation, clawbacks for a
certain part of the compensation if the results of transactions
underperform in the long term, and a ban on guaranteed bonuses.102 The
reform efforts are ongoing and, like the risk management improvements,
need time to come to fruition.103 Moreover, compensation arrangements
that are more long term in nature are possible in the corporate form, and
thus the fact that financial conglomerates are no longer partnerships has
no bearing on the compensation question.' 4 The flaws in the agency
99. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 51-102
(1998).
100. See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management
Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 76-77 (2005); Dennis A. Gioia, Business
Education's Role in the Crisis ofCorporate Confidence, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 142, 143 (2002).
101. See CuoMo, supra note 28.
102. For a summary of the reform efforts with respect to compensation in financial services, see
STEERING COMM. ON IMPLEMENTATION, INST. OF INT'L FIN., REFORM IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY: STRENGTHENING PRACTICES FOR A MORE STABLE SYSTEM (2009), available at
http://www.fide.org.my/publications/reports/0010_rep 20091214.pdf. I was a member of the Advisory
Panel on the compensation part of this report.
103. Reform efforts are also being undertaken by financial regulators. See, e.g., Incorporating
Employee Compensation Criteria into the Risk Assessment System, 75 Fed. Reg. 2823 (Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. proposed Jan. 19, 2010). Title IX of Dodd-Frank included compensation reforms, which
generally dealt with compensation in all public companies, not just financial conglomerates. See
§§ 951-57, 124 Stat. at 1899-1906. Section 956 of this Title did direct federal financial regulators to
issue regulations or guidelines that would require financial institutions to disclose their compensation
arrangements so that the regulators could determine whether those arrangements pose undue risks to the
institutions. See id. § 956, 124 Stat. at 1899-1900.
104. See, e.g., Roger Martin, The Age ofCustomer Capitalism, HARv. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2010,
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model are overblown because employees' self-interest can be linked to
the long-term well-being of their institution. Although there is an
international concern about the dangers of compensation policies in
financial conglomerates, the international approach-as seen in the
Institute of International Finance report-is to correct them, not to
break-up conglomerates in an attempt to remedy the problem. 105
E. Conflicts of Interest
Either one believes that the conflicts of interest can be adequately
dealt with by compliance and risk management systems in financial
conglomerates or that they cannot. In the latter case, a spin-off of at
least the conglomerate's proprietary activities would be the solution.
Beliefs matter here because evidence of these conflicts is not easy to
obtain in the absence of clear case of insider trading or self-dealing.
This is why the recent SEC enforcement action against Goldman Sachs
is interesting because it exposes the kind of conflict typical in a
conglomerate, where a firm is both an intermediary in transactions and
taking a principal position in them.106 It is likely that the international
regulatory perspective, so bound to a risk management approach, would
accept a compliance-based solution for this problem, rather than the
necessity of a break-up. 0 7
F. Government Support, Markets and Politics
A break-up of the financial conglomerate will not dislodge overnight
the financial elite, for the ideology sustaining this class has many
sources of support and is deeply ingrained in the political fabric.'0 s
However, the conglomerates provide power and resources to the elite
for, with their diverse financial activities, they are the paradigm of
at 58, 64-65 (discussing executive compensation with long post-retirement vesting period).
105. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/publbcbs I 66.pdf (discussing principles to guide compensation practices in financial
institutions); FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON COMPENSATION (2010), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publicationsr_00330a.pdf (summarizing compensation reform
efforts in different countries).
106. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REFORM AND
EXIT STRATEGIES 36 (2009) (discussing control procedures to restore confidence in financial
institutions).
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE
MARKETS: How FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009) (discussing how finance has permeated
throughout American life).
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finance, a training ground and a financial support of the elite and a
bastion around which other financial institutions (and seats of financial
power, like hedge funds and private equity funds) radiate and draw
resources. They are also the most direct way in which the financial elite
receive government support. The concern is that, as these institutions
continue to grow to enormous size, they will distort political life because
they will buy off politicians, the Executive Branch, and regulatory
agencies with their followers.109 Therefore, a break-up is the only way
to help take back political control from the financial elite, short of a
political upheaval. Moreover, a break-up that would remove the implicit
government guarantee from the conglomerates and the support for the
financial elite would produce a more competitive market for financial
services.
By contrast, a break-up may be seen as an overreaction to these
market and political concerns, the latter of which might be exaggerated
in any event. Certainly, a renewed focus on antitrust in financial
services could deal with inappropriate market power by the financial
conglomerates." 0  Moreover, as noted earlier,"' the financial
conglomerates are not just a product of government support and political
domination because there is an economic logic to them and thus there
will be costs to their break-up that might exceed the benefits. The
conglomerates have scale and scope economies from their size and
diverse services, and many of them performed better than less
diversified firms, such as investment banks, during the crisis.1 2 In other
words, one can no longer ignore the economic reality of large financial
firms than one can deny the economic justifications for large firms in
general. The answer is not to break them up, but to make them pay for
the implicit government guarantee, such as by a fee assessed against
conglomerates, which has been suggested by the Obama Administration.
Moreover, financial conglomerates are global and the dominant form
of financial firms outside the U.S. To break up U.S. conglomerates or to
reduce their size would hurt the U.S. financial industry in favor of either
109. See Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/7364/ (Johnson likens the
conglomerates to oligarchies in lesser developed countries that have captured the government).
110. This point is even made by Simon Johnson. See Posting of Simon Johnson to N.Y. Times
Economix, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/an-antitrust-investigation-of-the-banks/ (Jan.
21, 2010, 7:17 AM).
111. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
112. See David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Are U.S. Banks too Large?, (Fed. Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Research Div., Working Paper No. 2009-054B, 2009), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2009/2009-054.pdf (discussing scale and scope economies among large
financial institutions); see also Statement of Brian T. Moynihan, supra note 22, at 10.
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foreign financial firms or unregulated firms.113 Despite the setback of
the financial crisis, finance has been a source of strength and expertise in
the U.S. economy. It makes no sense to take unnecessary actions that
might hurt an industry and have lasting effects on U.S. economic
competitiveness. " 14
Finally, the political story of an elite benefitting from finance and
controlling U.S. political life may be overblown and even dangerous in
its own right. In many ways, finance has been liberating in ensuring that
resources flow without political favoritism to those with new ideas and
the best prospects. If anything, the problem has been that finance has
not gone far enough to deal with all the risks facing ordinary people." 5
The existence of financial elite (and of its compensation) represents
nothing more than the reality of economic gains from expertise in a
society in which finance plays a significant role." 6 Moreover, the elite
are hardly a closed one; it is ethnically diverse and open to anyone who
has the willingness to obtain the necessary expertise. In other words,
financial elites appear attractive when contrasted with elite status based
on characteristics like birth and hereditary wealth.' '"
G. Summary
Looking over this Part's discussion of potential solutions to the
problems associated with the financial conglomerate, there are clearly
strong pressures against their break-up. Indeed, the inclination of the
financial industry and regulators, both inside and outside the U.S., is to
maintain the status quo of the financial conglomerate, while improving
its internal compliance and external supervision. The improvements will
essentially consist of adjustments to existing technocratic frameworks,
such as capital requirements, risk management, and compensation
policies and design. By contrast, if one is fundamentally skeptical about
the adequacy of the technocratic solutions and concerned about social
upheavals triggered by the privileged position of the financial
113. See Statement of Hal S. Scott, supra note 15, at 22.
114. See generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS 201-225 (2003) (explaining how economic policies can reverse the economic fortunes of
countries). But see Turner, supra note 76, at 3, 12 (questioning whether increased financial innovation
has increased economic growth).
115. See SHILLER,supra note 97.
116. See generally Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the US
Financial Industry: 1909-2006 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14644, 2009)
(finding an expertise explanation for financial industry compensation, but also finding excess rents and
unsustainable nature of this compensation).
117. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 114, at 68-92.
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conglomerate and its employees, as well as the repeated economic
upheavals caused by the conglomerates, a break-up and size reduction
may be the only sensible answer to the problems posed by these
financial institutions.
V. BREAK-UP ALTERNATIVES
If, in light of the preceding Part's discussion regarding the problems
in conglomerates, one concludes that a break-up of them is the best
solution to address one or more of the problems, it is useful to consider
different options for a break-up. But it should be recognized that the
political situation is different from what it was in early 2009, when
financial conglomerates were weakened and in need of government
support, and when the federal government had a somewhat free hand
with respect to them. Now that the financial system has stabilized and
most of the major financial conglomerates have paid back the capital
infusions from the government, they are mobilized to respond to
legislative and regulatory proposals that would affect them." 8  Thus,
any effort to break-up financial conglomerates will meet with resistance.
This outcome is likely for the better because financial reform legislation
should not happen in a panic or rush, but should be informed by an
active debate of all interested parties so long as all options are seriously
considered and the political power of the conglomerates does not dictate
the results.119 Moreover, since financial conglomerates operate globally,
how a particular option is viewed by foreign regulators, foreign
institutions, and international bodies must be taken into account. The
118. See, e.g., Robin Sidel & Damian Paletta, Mr. Dimon Goes to Washington, WALL ST. J., Apr.
7, 2010, at Al. The article discusses lobbying efforts by JP Morgan CEO James Dimon and his firm.
Part of their efforts is to offer explanations for the financial crisis, such as the influx of overseas funds
and the government policies promoting low-cost home mortgages, that excuse the financial
conglomerates from most of the blame for the financial crisis. See, e.g., Statement of Lloyd C.
Blankfein, supra note 57, at 7 (blaming the crisis on an unreasonable market panic). And defenders of
the financial conglomerates have emerged in full force in the academy, particularly from prestigious
institutions. See, e.g., Statement of Hal S. Scott, supra note 15.
119. The problem, however, is that there is evidence that, through campaign contributions, the
financial conglomerates have put certain options off the table in the financial reform, such as size
limitations to them. See Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario,
http://baselinescenario.com/2010/05/07/falling-back-on-waterloo/ (May 7, 2010, 9:56 AM) (discussing
the defeat of the Brown-Kaufman amendment to the Senate financial reform bill, which was to limit the
size of the conglomerates). For this amendment, see Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act
of 2010, S. 3241, 11Ith Cong. (2010) (among other proposed reforms, limiting to 10% the amount of
national deposits any banking institution to have, imposing a 6% leverage ratio on financial firms,
limiting nondeposit liabilities of any financial firm to 2% of gross domestic product, and requiring
regulators to take immediate action, through the sale of assets or reduction of activities, to bring a firm
into compliance with the rules, with no discretion to regulators to waive the requirements).
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options that will be considered below are as follows: (1) a gradual break-
up of the conglomerates; (2) a spin-off of the certain parts of the
conglomerates; (3) a return to Glass-Steagall's separation between
commercial and investment banking; and (4) a separation between retail
and wholesale banking.120
A. Gradual Break-up: Making Financial Conglomerates Expensive
This option means enhancing the regulation of financial
conglomerates to deal with their systemic risk and making them pay for
the implicit government guarantee. In time, this would drive up their
costs to an appropriate level and may prove to be too expensive for the
conglomerates to operate in their current form. In other words, the
option would be a gradual, market-based transformation of the status
quo that would not upset financial institutions in these still fragile times.
This appears to be the Obama Administration's preference, as it has
proposed general size limitations on conglomerates, as well as fees on
them for recovery of government funds.121 Moreover, this approach is
consistent with current regulatory initiatives of many federal regulators,
which are imposing more onerous requirements upon conglomerates to
address the problems highlighted earlier.122 In addition, because reform
is being proposed with respect to many of the unregulated markets, such
as over-the-counter derivatives, where conglomerates operate, the
conglomerates will incur enhanced costs on their activities. 123
Furthermore, as noted throughout this Article, this approach has the
advantage of support from international financial regulatory bodies, such
as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and would mirror the
current international approach with respect to the conglomerates, which
is to regulate them more strictly.
120. For an excellent consideration of these and other alternatives, see Ingo Walter, The New Case
for Functional Separation in Wholesale Financial Services 26-32 (July 30, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1442148).
121. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
122. The regulations impose higher capital requirements upon conglomerates, heightened risk
management procedures, and higher fees to address various problems. See supra notes 94, 103 and
accompanying text; see also Stephen Joyce, Regulators Already Working to Implement Key Aims of
Pending Financial Reform Bills, 22 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 483 (Apr. 8, 2010) (discussing financial
regulators' current initiatives).
123. See, e.g., S. 3217, supra note 82, at Title VII (entitled "Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability"). Title VII of Dodd-Frank in fact imposed considerable regulation on over-the-counter
swap markets. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 711-54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1754 (July 21, 2010). In effect, the approach of Dodd-Frank
is in line with this gradual break-up approach because it imposes new regulatory costs upon the
conglomerates.
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The problem with this option is that it may not end conglomerates
because they will be able to water down the legislation, reducing the
costs imposed on them, which means that they will not pay entirely for
the implicit government support. Any legislation that passes (such as
Dodd-Frank) will require implementing regulations that leave
considerable discretion to financial regulators, particularly with respect
to such matters as capital requirements and related risk management.124
It is likely that, when the economy improves, conglomerates can
convince the regulators, who often come from the conglomerates and
hope to return to employment with them, that strict regulatory
restrictions should be loosened or dropped.125 Therefore, the risk of the
gradualist approach is that financial conglomerates endure despite
changes to the laws and regulations.
B. Spin-Off of the "Dangerous" Parts of Conglomerates
Under this approach, there would be an effort to identify the most
troubling parts of a conglomerate with respect to the problems discussed
earlier and then to require that these parts be spun off from the
institution.126 A version is the Volcker Rule, which would require that a
financial conglomerates spin off proprietary trading operations, hedge
funds, and private equity fund sponsorship and investments.127 Another
version of this approach is the recent proposal to bring dealing in over-
the-counter derivatives and swaps by conglomerates onto organized
markets, with prudential requirements for dealers, which might have the
effect of separating this activity from them.128
A difficulty with this approach is to decide which parts of the
financial conglomerates are the most troubling and which problem one is
addressing by the divestment, for it will determine the spin-off strategy.
That is, is the goal to address systemic risk, risk management,
commoditization, compensation policies, conflicts of interest, or
government support and politics, or some combination of them? For
example, although the Volcker Rule has been justified on grounds of
systemic risk and risk management, it also appears to be grounded in
political concerns: a response to the suspicion that financial
124. The current Senate bill is replete with such discretion. See id. § 165 (describing the Federal
Reserve's enhanced regulation of Tier I institutions).
125. Arguably, this is what happened with respect to financial regulation before the financial
cTisis.
126. See, e.g., Walter, supra note 120, at 31.
127. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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conglomerates are using the implicit government subsidy to subsidize
their own trading and to enrich their employees and shareholders. 129
But if the purpose of the spin-off is not clearly identified, it will be more
controversial and its implementation more difficult. Again to use the
Volcker Rule as an example, while financial firms have raised (and
continue to raise) the difficulty of separating proprietary from client
based market making,' 30 the response of the proponents is simply to
push the hard decisions off on financial regulators.' ' If the main
purpose of a spin-off is to prevent systemic risk, other operations of the
conglomerate might also be targeted, such as securitized lending, the
creation of exotic financial products, and leveraged lending.' 32
Moreover, if the spun-off activities are dangerous on their own, they
need additional regulation. 133
International support for the spin-off approach is uncertain, and, if it
exists, it may exist for the wrong reasons. On the one hand, the financial
conglomerate is the norm outside the United States; therefore, any effort
to break it up, directly or indirectly, is likely to encounter foreign
resistance. On the other hand, foreign financial regulators might be
supportive of a spin-off, such as with respect to hedge fund and private
equity fund operations. But their support might arise from the fact that
these operations are an Anglo-American invention and not well-
established in Europe. 134
C Return to Glass-Steagall
As many have now noted,135 the period of Glass-Steagall's separation
of commercial and investment banking was a period of considerable
stability in finance. Accordingly, another approach would reinstate that
129. See Statement of Paul A. Volcker, supra note 42, at 1-2.
130. See Statement of Hal S. Scott, supra note 15, at 11-12.
131. See Statement of Paul A. Volcker, supra note 42, at 4.
132. See Statement of Hal S. Scott, supra note 15, at 9-10 (discussing financial activities that
were at the heart of the crisis).
133. This is, in fact, the approach of the current reform legislation, which would bring more
financial activities, such as swaps and over-the-counter derivatives, into regulatory jurisdiction and
would regulate hedge fund advisors, as well as non-regulated firms whose failure would create systemic
risk. See S. 3217, supra note 81, at Title IX, Title IV.
134. There is a certain truth to the perception that, while hedge funds did not cause the financial
crisis, the crisis has been used as an excuse in the United States and in Europe to extend regulation to
this part of the financial industry. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY
10-11 (2009).
135. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 71, at 25; Martin Mayer, Glass-Steagall in our Future: How
Straight, How Narrow, 6-7 (Ind. State Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief No. 2009-PB-07, 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1505488; Walter, supra note 120, at 3.
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law, essentially putting the genie back into the bottle and returning to a
situation in financial services where investment banking, commercial
banking, and insurance would be completely separate.136 For example, a
commercial bank could not engage in investment banking or be in an
affiliated group with a broker-dealer. This approach would not have to
exclude other reforms that were not part of Glass-Steagall, such as
extending regulation to unregulated "Tier 1" firms and establishing a
systemic risk regulator.
This approach is likely to be difficult to accomplish from theoretical,
practical, and political perspectives. The theoretical justification for
Glass-Steagall's repeal-that it makes no economic sense to separate
activities that are all financial-has not changed. Moreover, during the
years when Glass-Steagall was in force, issues of line-drawing
constantly surfaced, and the results often seemed artificial. Furthermore,
as securities markets have developed, the domain of commercial
banking has become smaller, as was seen with the growth of loan
securitizations. Thus, to reinstate Glass-Steagall would be to put
commercial banking in an untenable position.' 37 In addition, because
different financial areas have grown together and intertwined before and
after the repeal of the Act, it would now be an enormous and costly task
to unravel them. From a political perspective, it took almost twenty
years to marshal the political forces to repeal Glass-Steagall and similar
political support for reinstating it does not exist. Finally, there will be
almost no international support for this approach because the norm in
developed countries is to combine in one firm, not to separate, financial
services.
D. Public Utility Approach
This approach would be to restructure and to reduce the size of the
financial conglomerates in a novel way by separating out and thus
creating "public utility" or retail financial institutions that would provide
commodity financial services and "plain vanilla" products to consumers
and small businesses in banking advice, brokerage advice, investment
advice, and insurance.' 38 The deposits of only these institutions would
136. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, Bring Back Glass-Steagall, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010, at A21.
137. But see Walter, supra note 120, at 30-31 (arguing that reinstatement of Glass-Steagall could
make economic sense). And, in fact, Dodd-Frank does not separate commercial and investment
banking.
138. For related proposals, see Emilios Avgouleas, The Reform of 'Too-Big-To-Fail' Bank: A New
Regulatory Model for the Institutional Separation of 'Casino'from 'Utility' Banking (Feb. 14, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1552970); Walter, supra note 120, at 31.
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be insured by the federal government, and these firms alone should
benefit from an implicit government guarantee. The wholesale side of
financial conglomerates, which would involve market-making in
exchange and off-exchange financial products, securities underwriting,
insurance underwriting, and structuring of asset securitizations, would
essentially operate separately from the retail institutions. The deposits
of these institutions would not be federally insured, but the institutions
would still be subject to federal oversight and to a resolution regime.
Reducing the size of financial conglomerates could be combined with
this approach.139
Of course, this approach, like the return to Glass-Steagall, raises line-
drawing issues-such as determining which activities would be allowed
in the retail institutions. Once again, one suspects that this
wholesale/retail approach with size limitations would not be popular
abroad, given that foreign financial conglomerates have traditionally
combined wholesale and retail activities. But it is possible that foreign
policy makers may become more receptive to some aspects of this
approach, because they, too, have experienced firsthand the tremendous
costs that the collapse of financial institutions have imposed upon their
governments.140  Moreover, other countries may be eager to rein in
financial conglomerates with a securities orientation because their home-
grown conglomerates have traditionally been more bank-centered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The overall conclusion of the Article is that, while many of the
problems in the financial conglomerates argue for their break-up, the
practical and political reality, including the orientation of international
financial regulation, is that the conglomerates will endure. That is, these
firms appear to pose a significant economic and political risk to this
country. Because they cannot be effectively risk managed, especially in
light of their products and short-term compensation, they run the risk of
repeated failure, which exposes the government and taxpayers to
potential costs associated with the bailouts necessary to avoid systemic
risks. The bailouts coupled with the visibility of the extraordinary
rewards for a financial elite working in and controlling conglomerates,
139. This would involve setting firm limits on the size of either a retail or wholesale conglomerate
out of concern that the failure of any one (and certainly of more than one) can almost bankrupt a
country. Indeed, a model of such an approach is the SAFE Act, which was defeated as an amendment to
S. 3217. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Again, Dodd-Frank did not accept this approach.
140. One thinks of the situation in Iceland, where the collapse of financial institutions has
bankrupted the country.
585
586 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.79
regardless of a firm's performance, and with the accompanying conflicts
of interest have stirred up political opposition to the firms. Therefore,
although it may make the most economic and political sense to combine
firm limits on conglomerates' size with a spin-off or separation of
certain activities, the status quo of the conglomerates will likely prevail,
although they will in the short term be regulated more closely, both
domestically and internationally, and have to pay more for their implicit
government guarantee.
